This study analyzes the impact of bank relationships on a firm's borrowing costs. We find that a firm's borrowing costs decrease with relationship strength, proxied by the share of bank debt provided by the lender. Borrowing costs, however, rise with relationship length. While the increase over time is weak on average, bank-dependent borrowers face a substantial premium after several relationship years. Switching the lender initially leads to only a small price discount on average. However, the discount is considerable for borrowers that switch and had a strong relationship with their previous lender. Our results suggest that close lending relationships lead to benefits for the firm, but may also imply hold-up costs in the long term.
INTRODUCTION
In most countries of the world, bank finance is the primary source of finance. A major reason for this fact is that banks are better able to mitigate certain types of information asymmetries inherent in financing companies than markets. Close, long-lasting lending relationships, therefore, in general, improve access to credit. The impact of lending relationships on borrowing costs is, however, not clear: One strand of the literature claims that close, long-term relationships reduce lending rates, since information asymmetries between borrower and lender are reduced (see, e.g., Boot and Thakor, 1994; Bris and Welch, 2005) . The other strand in the literature argues that, over the course of the relationship, banks acquire an information advantage compared to outside investors, which enables them to hold-up their borrowers and enforce higher lending rates (Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990) .
In this paper, we use a unique, proprietary dataset to investigate the impact of lending relationships on borrowing costs. Our database consists of panel data of bank-firm relationships in Germany over 12 years and contains 18,119 observations. Germany, often cited as the classical example of a bank-based system, offers an ideal environment for studying the impact of lending relationships. We consider two dimensions of lending relationships: the strength of the relationshipproxied by the share of bank debt provided by the lenderand the length and examine how these two factors affect a firm's borrowing costs. We thereby focus on relationships with the main bank. Moreover, we also examine how borrowing costs develop around switching the main lender.
Our key findings are as follows. Relationship strength and duration have a different impact on borrowing costs. While borrowing costs decrease with relationship strength, they rise with the duration of the lending relationship. However, the increase of borrowing costs over time is rather weak. This implies that companies that have a strong relationship to their main lender still enjoy a substantial financing advantage after several relationship years (of around 20 basis points for firms with a relationship of at least five years). This finding is, however, only valid for average borrowers. The financing advantage also depends on the share of non-bank finance. Bank-dependent borrowers, i.e. borrowers with a high percentage of total bank debt (typically small firms in Germany), face a considerable interest rate premium after several relationship years (of around 30 basis points).
Our results suggest that close lending relationships lead to benefits for average borrowers. They may, however, also imply larger costs in the medium to long term owing to a hold-up by the relationship bank. In particular, bankdependent borrowers face a substantial risk of a hold-up. Our results for how borrowing costs evolve around switching the main lender are also consistent with hold-up costs. We find that switching the main lender leads, on average, to a small (insignificant) price discount in the year of the switch. We investigate the discount and switching in more detail. We find that borrowers that had a strong relationship with their previous main lender receive a large and significant discount, while there is no discount at all for borrowers without a strong relationship. This finding suggests that the previous main lender was able to require an interest rate premium only in the case of borrowers with a strong relationship.
Results in the related empirical literature are often contradictory (see the literature review in Degryse et al., 2009) . For instance, Berger and Udell (1995) find that loan rates decrease with the duration of lending relationships, while Degryse and Ongena (2005) find the opposite. Conflicting results are also found for how the number of lending relationships impacts borrowing costs (see, e.g., Angelini et al., 1998; Petersen and Rajan, 1994) . For Germany, results are also contradictory. While, for instance, Hainz and Wiegand (2013) and Lehmann and Neuberger (2001) find that some relationship variables affect loan prices, Elsas and Krahnen (1998) and Harhoff and K€ orting (1998) do not find an impact. The conflicting results may be explained by differences in the empirical specification, definition of key variables andwith respect to the international evidencethe different geographic focus. In this paper, we offer an additional, new explanation for the different outcomes. The impact of relationship variables on borrowing costs depends very much on a firm's remaining financial structure, in particular a firm's share of non-bank finance. This variable is, for instance, influenced by a company's size and development of bonds markets.
Compared to the previous literature on the German market, our dataset is much larger and covers a considerably longer period. Moreover, the existing German studies make use of survey data and, mostly, focus on special segments of the lending market (e.g. SMEs; Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001) or lending relationships with large banks (e.g., Elsas and Krahnen, 1998) . We have information on firms of different size classes (except very small firms) and include relationships with all types of banks. Survey-based studies offer the advantage of including qualitative information (e.g., expert judgements). We complement such studies by covering a broad range of quantitative indicators.
Our paper also deals with the question how borrowing costs evolve around switching the main lender. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first who examine this question for Germany. Internationally, the impact of switching on borrowing costs has been studied by Bharath et al. (2011) and Gopalan et al. (2011) for the United States and Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) for Bolivia. While Bharath et al. (2011) and Gopalan et al. (2011) use the LPC Dealscan database, and therefore focus on very large companies in the United States, the sample of Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) consists of data for Bolivia and contains mainly small companies. By contrast, our sample contains a considerable percentage of small, medium-sized and large firms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related theoretical literature. In Section 3, we describe the underlying data set and the construction of our main variables. Section 4 contains descriptive statistics and first results. Results of the regressions are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
THEORY
This paper deals with two questions: first, how relationship strength and relationship length affect a firm's borrowing costs. Second, how a firm's borrowing costs evolve around switching the main lender. There are a number of theoretical papers about these questions, with divergent conclusions. One strand of the literature stresses the positive sides of close, long-lasting lending relationships. Bris and Welch (2005) argue that borrowing costs decrease if a firm borrows a large fraction from one lender. A concentrated creditor has high incentives to monitor the borrower, whereas dispersed creditors suffer from coordination failures and mutual free-riding. By choosing a concentrated creditor, a borrower commits himself to work hard which leads to lower lending rates.
Borrowing costs may also decrease in long lending relationships. By monitoring borrower performance over time, lenders accumulate information (Diamond, 1984) . Repeated borrowing should, therefore, be associated with lower costs for the lender. If the lender shares these cost savings with the borrower, lending rates should decrease over the lending relationship. Moreover, even without learning effects, loan rates may decrease in long time lending relationships. Long-term credit contracts allow conditioning lending rates on prior performance, thereby enhancing borrowers' incentives and leading to a stepwise decrease in loan rates over time (Boot and Thakor, 1994) . The argument of Boot and Thakor (1994) also suggests that switching relationship lenders is associated with an increase in lending rates since the less successful firms tend to switch.
The other strand of the literature points to potential costs of close, long-term lending relationships. Over the course of the relationship, relationship lenders acquire an information advantage compared to outside uninformed lenders. Outside investors, therefore, face an adverse selection problem. This has the consequence that borrowers get to some extent locked in the relationship. Relationship lenders are able to hold-up their borrowers and enforce higher lending rates as time passes (Rajan, 1992) . Moreover, theory also suggests that borrowing costs rise with the share of the relationship lender. The relationship
The Price Impact of Lending Relationships lender's debt share influences its own incentives and those of outside banks to gather information and thus the relationship lender's information advantage and the potential for a hold-up.
However, from a lifetime perspective, the increase of borrowing costs over time does not need to be detrimental for the company. As the models of Petersen and Rajan (1995) , Sharpe (1990) and von Thadden (2004) show, relationship banks may subsidize borrowers at the beginning of a relationship and extract rents later (when borrowers are locked in) to recoup their losses. This would imply a somewhat different development of lending rates over the relationship, i.e. lending rates would be lower (than a comparable one-period loan) at the beginning of the relationship and higher at a later stage. Finally, with respect to switching relationship lenders, the hold-up argument implies that switching to a new (relationship) lender leads to a drop in a firm's borrowing costs (see, in particular, von Thadden, 2004 ).
DATA

Sample description
We use a unique bank-firm level dataset that contains annual information from 1993 to 2004. The dataset is composed of three different databases compiled by the Deutsche Bundesbank: i) the German credit register ('MiMiK'), containing single bank-firm credit relationships, ii) German firms' balance sheet data ('Jalys/ Ustan') and iii) German banks' balance sheet data and audit reports ('BAKIS'). The dataset used for this study thus provides information as to whether a bank grants credit to a specific firm (through dataset i) as well as the characteristics of the corresponding firms (ii) and banks (iii). In our analysis, we focus on the main lender and therefore keep only the information on the largest lender. In the online Appendix S1, we provide some information about the single datasets and describe the matching process, which was a precondition for composing the data used in this study. The final data set consists of annual data for 3,741 firms and contains 18,119 observations.
Since the underlying datasets are used for supervisory or monetary policy purposes, the information in our dataset is supposed to be more reliable and of better quality overall than information in publicly available databases or survey data. A limitation of our database is that it predominantly contains relatively large loans, which results from the reporting threshold in the German credit register. Banks in Germany are required to report credit to the Bundesbank only if their exposures to an individual borrower or the sum of exposures to borrowers belonging to one borrower unit exceeds the threshold of EUR 1.5 million once in the respective quarter. Nevertheless, a large portion of single exposures in the database are below EUR 1.5 million, owing, for example, to the fact that the threshold is applied at the group level (see Schmieder, 2006) . In the matched database, 36% of the exposures are below EUR 1.5 million.
To investigate a potential sample bias, we calculate for each observation the ratio of balance sheet indebtedness (according to the credit register) over total bank loans (reported in the firm's balance sheet). Table 1 shows the distribution of this ratio. The table indicates that the credit register is likely to contain the I. Stein bulk of banks' claims for most companies in our sample. However, there are a number of companies where the balance sheet indebtedness in the credit register is higher than the sum of bank loans on a firm's balance sheet. This is due to the fact that the credit register and the balance sheet statistics refer to different definitions of debt. Whereas the balance sheet statistics apply a legal definition of indebtedness, the credit register adopts an economic perspective. For example, a firm's bonds held by a bank are classified as bonds in the corporate balance sheet statistics, but as bank credit in the credit register. In other instances, the credit register tends to understate a firm's bank loans: Written-off loans, for example, are not included in the credit register, but are included in the balance sheet statistics. Overall, the different concepts of debt make comparisons difficult. We will consider this issue subsequently.
Construction of main variables
Measuring borrowing costs
Borrowing costs are derived from a firm's balance sheet data by means of an implicit firm-specific interest rate spread (see Kim et al., 2006) . It is calculated as follows (where i indicates the firm and t the year):
interest expenses it average interest bearing debt it À yield on German industrial bonds t Average interest bearing debt in t is calculated as the mean of the correspondent values at the beginning and the end of year t. To deal with outliers, values below the 2th percentile and values above the 98th percentile are excluded from the sample. Our measure of borrowing costs does not distinguish between borrowing costs for bank loans and borrowing costs for other interest bearing debt instruments, such as bonds or loans from associated companies, as we do not have access to such data. However, since for the median firm, 55% of interest bearing debt is provided by banks, our measure of borrowing costs is strongly influenced by banks. In the regressions, we control for the share of other debt instruments. 
Measuring strength and duration of lending relationships
For the empirical analysis, we consider only relationships with the main bank, i.e. the bank granting the largest share of loans to the firm (measured by stock of loans). 1 By focusing on relationships with the main lender, we expect the impact of potential benefits of lending relationships and costs to become particularly clear. This approach follows Herrera and Minetti (2007) and is also similar to papers using the LPC Dealscan database that focus on relationships with the lead investor (see, e.g., Bharath et al., 2011) .
Strength of lending relationship
We measure the strength of the (main) lending relationship using the share of bank debt provided by the (main) lender. A high fraction of debt has proved to be a very important and reliable indicator for relationship lending, i.e. for the existence of close ties between borrower and lender (see Elsas, 2005) . The main lender's share of bank debt is calculated by dividing the amount of loans of the respective bank (to the firm) by the firm's total borrowing from banks (both variables as stock values at time t). We transform this variable into a dummy variable and classify a relationship as strong if the bank holds a share of at least 80% (StrongRel = 1). We choose a threshold of 80% to indicate a dominant exposure of the main lender. The threshold is to some extent discretionary. As robustness checks, we vary the threshold for the dummy variable and take alternative levels, for example, of 70%. The indicator is determined based on information from the credit register. This offers the advantage (compared to balance sheet data) that we not only capture lending by traditional loans, but that we also have information on off-balance sheet lending. We are, therefore, able to apply a broader measure for the importance of a bank. As the amount of total bank borrowing (denominator) is also derived from the credit register, this approach has the shortcoming that the variable is affected by truncation in the database and may thus overstate the importance of the largest lender. To account for this fact, we apply relatively strict measures for StrongRel (minimum share of a firm's bank loans of 80%). Moreover, as we previously discussed, definitions of bank loans differ significantly between the credit register and firm balance sheets. It is, therefore, difficult to construct an indicator that combines the two statistics in a consistent way. We take account of truncation effects in the database by various robustness checks below.
Duration of lending relationship
The duration of a lending relationship reflects the interaction of borrower and lender over time and is also a common indicator of relationship lending (see, e.g., Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994) . Following Herrera and Minetti (2007) , we measure the duration of the relationship with the main lender (Duration) as the number of subsequent years for which a bank has been a firm's main lender. By focusing on the time span with the main lender, we expect (as above) that the benefits and costs of lending relationships resulting from the information 1. At every point in time t, there is only one main lender.
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production by the main lender become especially clear. In contrast to smaller lenders, a firm's main lender has a high incentive to collect information and cannot easily free-ride on screening and monitoring activities of other lenders. From a theoretical perspective, a firm's main lender functions as a delegated monitor of the other lenders (Diamond, 1984) . The main lender thus accumulates a significant information advantage over time, implying that the risk of a hold-up by the main lender is also more pronounced. Hence, the theoretical arguments related to information production should be more easily testable.
The value of Duration is closely related to switching the main lender, which is measured by the variable Switch. Switch equals 1 if the largest lender in the current period is not equal to the largest lender in the previous period, i.e. if the firm has switched to a new main lender in the current period. If Switch equals 1, we set the value of Duration to 1.
With respect to measuring duration, three types of data issues arise. First, we do not have separate information on the length of relationships, but measure the duration by counting the number of years over the sample period. The value of duration is, therefore, downward-biased. However, since we measure duration by the number of subsequent years for which a bank has been a firm's main lender (and not by the number of subsequent years a bank has maintained a relationship with the firm), our measure of duration is shorter and the issue of censoring is less acute. In the regressions, we consider only companies for which we have at least six years of observations, i.e. we include companies only from the sixth observation onwards. Moreover, we control for the number of years a company has been included in the sample up to the current year. We carry out additional robustness checks.
Second, for some firms, we cannot determine the largest lender for the total period in which the firm is included in the sample since the credit register does not contain information on the firm for some years. This issue affects the measurement of Duration since this variable counts the number of years for which a bank has been the largest lender. With regard to such gaps in our data, i.e. if data are missing for some years, we proceed as follows. If the largest lender before an information gap remains the largest lender after a gap, we assume that the firm has not changed its main lender in between. If, however, the largest lender before a gap is not the largest lender after a gap and the gap is no longer than two years, we assume that the firm has switched to the new main lender in the middle of the data gap.
Third, in the sample period, banks were frequently involved in mergers. We, therefore, examine whether a firm's main lender was taken over. If we observe that a firm has a new main lender in period t that has acquired the firm's previous main lender in period t or tÀ1 (or if there is a data gap in the time span between t and the previous observed period), we do not classify this event as a switch of the main lender (i.e. the relationship with the main lender does not end). Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics for our dependent variables and the explanatory variables. Borrowing costs, measured by Spread, are, on average, The Price Impact of Lending Relationships slightly negative (À24 basis points). 58.5% of the companies in the sample have a strong relationship with their main lender (StrongRel = 1), i.e. raise at least 80% of their bank loans from one bank. If we vary the threshold above which a relationship is defined as strong (see StrongRel 90% and StrongRel 70% ), the value changes only by a few percentage points. 15.8% of the companies switch their main lender on average per year. Table 2 also contains information about control variables. The 25th (75th) percentile of firm sales equals EUR 5 million (EUR 41 million), i.e. more than 75% of the companies in our sample have a sales volume of less than EUR 50 million. Our sample, therefore, consists mainly of small and medium-sized firms, but it contains also large companies (as indicated by the 90th percentile of sales which equals approximately EUR 150 million). 2 To control for company default risk, we 2. The standard deviation of company assets and sales is very large. In the regressions, we do not consider company sales, but only company assets. We logarithmize the variable to mitigate potential problems stemming from outliers. use a probability of default measure which is calculated from firm balance sheet data. 3 The average probability of default (over a one-year horizon) equals approximately 2%. To deal with potential data outliers, we censorized the probability of default at the 99% level. 4 Before going forward to the regressions, we discuss some descriptive evidence on the relation between borrowing costs and relationship strength and length. Figure 1 shows evidence with respect to relationship strength. We divide the sample into ten groups subject to i) the strength of the relationship (StrongRel = 1 or StrongRel = 0) and ii) five firm size classes (measured by firm assets). For each group, we then determine the main quantiles of the Spread distribution (median, 25th and 75th quantile). We control for firm size, since size strongly interferes with relationship strength. For each quantile and for each size class, firms with a strong relationship with their main lender exhibit lower borrowing costs than firms without a strong relationship. This striking difference across all size classes and quantiles suggests that the existence of a strong relationship helps to reduce borrowing costs. Figure 1 Borrowing costs for companies with and without a strong relationship with their main lender Notes. Borrowing costs are measured by a firm's interest rate spread (Spread). It is calculated as a firm's annual average borrowing costs minus the yield on German industrial bonds. The existence of a strong relationship is measured by the dummy variable StrongRel. StrongRel equals 1 if a firm concentrates at least 80% of its borrowing at one bank (0 otherwise). The figure shows the 25th quantile, the median and the 75th quantile of Spread, dependent on firm size class (measured by firm assets) and StrongRel.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND FIRST RESULTS
3. The PD is derived from a binary logistic regression model. The explanatory variables are capital ratio, short-term assets/short-term liabilities, profitability, size and industry dummies. See Gerke et al. (2006) for further information. 4. This means that we set those values above the 99th quantile exactly equal to the 99th quantile.
In Table 3 , we investigate whether relationship duration works in the same direction as relationship strength. Similar to Figure 1 , we divide the sample into three groups subject to relationship length and calculate quantiles of a firm's interest spread for each group. We then compare, for each quantile, borrowing costs across the three duration groups. We find that borrowing costs rather increase with duration: For each quantile, a firm's borrowing costs are the lowest if a firm has switched to a new main lender in the current period. Borrowing costs are in a medium range if Duration is between two and four years and are the highest if Duration is at least five years. Overall, information from descriptive statistics gives a first hint that relationship strength and relationship length work in opposite directions.
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
Specification and results
In our regressions, we proceed in three steps. First, we examine the effect of the existence of a strong relationship on borrowing costs. We call this step the static impact of lending relationships. We also consider a set of control variables:
Control variables are bank and firm size (both measured by the log of total assets) and firm credit quality (measured by the probability of default 5 and the share of fixed assets as proxy for pledgeable collateral). We also include measures for firm debt structure and year dummies (to control for the time trend in our dataset). In the second step, we look at the dynamic effects, i.e. we augment the basic model by including relationship duration and interaction terms of duration and strength: 5. For a brief explanation of the PD see footnote 3. The PD does not include information on the share of fixed assets.
In the third step, we examine the development of borrowing costs around a switch of the main lender. The basic model is of the following form:
where Switch is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has switched to a new main lender in the current period (and 0 otherwise). We augment Equation (3) by including interaction terms of Switch and characteristics of the relationship with the previous main lender. For instance, we include an interaction term of Switch and StrongRel tÀ1 . To simplify interpretation, we construct pairwise interaction terms, i.e. we include, for instance, an interaction term of Switch and StrongRel tÀ1 as well as an interaction term of Switch and Non-StrongRel tÀ1 (where Non-StrongRel tÀ1 = 1 À StrongRel tÀ1 ):
We proceed in the same way with respect to Duration. All models are panel data models and estimated by OLS regressions. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. Table 4 shows the results of our regressions based on Equations (1) and (2). As model (1) indicates, firms that maintain a strong relationship with their main lender have significantly lower borrowing costs. They obtain, on average, an interest rate discount of 39 basis points compared to firms without a strong relationship. One explanation for this result is that agency problems are mitigated by borrowing a large fraction from one lender (Bris and Welch, 2005) . While dispersed creditors suffer from mutual free-riding, concentrated creditors (such as relationship lenders) have better incentives to monitor, thereby reducing moral hazard. Moreover, in case of financial distress, a concentrated creditor has a higher bargaining power which makes it more difficult for the management to renegotiate debt and expropriate creditors. A management that chooses a concentrated creditor commits itself to work hard leading to lower lending rates. Besides this, information and transaction cost of lending are presumably lower if a company's borrowing requirement (or a large fraction of it) is covered by a single creditor. If the lender shares these cost savings with the borrower, lending rates are lower.
Dynamic impact of lending relationships (Equation 2)
In models (2)-(4) of Table 4 , we augment the basic model (1) by considering different variables for the duration of the lending relationship. Models (2)-(4) are based on a subsample of companies for which we have at least six years of observations. Specifically, we include companies only from the sixth observation onwards. The reason for this is that we do not have separate information on the The Price Impact of Lending Relationships duration of lending relationships, but can measure duration only by observing relationships over the sample period. We, therefore, focus on the second half of the sample in order to gain a meaningful and sufficient variation in duration. 6 Moreover, in our regressions on the impact of duration we always control for the number of years a company has been included in the sample up to the current year (see the variable Firm years), in order to differentiate between the impact of Duration and potential effects resulting from the inclusion in the sample. This control variable is not significant in any regression model. One caveat to our results is that, due to the rough measurement of duration, our results may be noisy. We carry out robustness checks with respect to this issue below. In contrast to relationship strength, relationship length has a positive impact on borrowing costs. Borrowing costs, therefore, increase with relationship length, while they decrease with relationship strength. The positive impact is in line with the descriptive results in Section 4 and consistent with the prediction of a hold-up. In model (2), we measure relationship length in a linear way by Duration. In model (3), we modify relationship length into a dummy variable (to simplify interpretations). The variable LongDuration equals 1 if a bank has been a firm's main lender for at least five years (0 otherwise). In both specifications, relationship length is positive and statistically significant. The impact on borrowing costs is, however, considerably weaker than the impact of relationship strength.
In model (4), we include an interaction term of Duration and StrongRel to investigate whether the influence of Duration interferes with the strength of the lending relationship. The interaction term is indeed positive and significant (in statistical and economical terms). The positive interaction term indicates that the interest rate discount granted to very close borrowers (i.e. relationships with StrongRel = 1) decreases over time. The coefficients of the variable StrongRel and of the interaction term Duration*StrongRel suggest, however, that the interest rate discount will vanish only after more than 10 years.
This dynamic profile may result from an intertemporal smoothing of lending rates, i.e. that banks grant a discount at the beginning of a relationship which they recoup later (see Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Sharpe, 1990; von Thadden, 2004) . However, the fact that close borrowers benefit from lower lending rates over a long period suggests that additional factors play a role. As just discussed, concentration of debt on a relationship lender may generate advantages by mitigating agency problems and saving transaction costs.
To examine the dynamic effects further, we examine whether the impact of relationship strength and length differs for bank-dependent borrowers and non bank-dependent ones. Santos and Winton (2008) show that bank-dependent borrowers (measured by lack of access to public debt markets) pay higher lending rates than borrowers with access to public debt markets. Bank-dependent firms have less viable alternative financing sources. The risk of a hold-up by banks is, therefore, larger leading to higher lending rates (Rajan, 1992) . We measure bank-6. In addition, it is important to keep in mind that we measure duration by the number of subsequent years for which a bank has been a firm's main lender (and not by the number of subsequent years a bank has a relationship with the firm). Our measure of duration is thus shorter and the issue of censoring is less acute. dependence more broadly in line with our measure for borrowing costs. We use the share of total bank debt to interest bearing debt. We classify borrowers above the 75th (below the 25th) percentile of the ratio of total bank debt to interest bearing debt as bank-dependent (not bank-dependent) borrowers. We successively restrict the sample to each group of borrowers and repeat regression models (2) and (3). If bank-dependent borrowers face a larger hold-up risk, we expect the cost-increasing effect of duration to be larger for them. Likewise, the costdecreasing impact of strength should be smaller reflecting their lower bargaining power.
The evidence in Table 4 is in line with our prediction. For bank-dependent borrowers, the coefficient of the dummy variable StrongRel sharply shrinks from À39 basis points to slightly above zero and the variable is no longer significant [see models (5) and (6)]. Thus, relationship strength no longer has a cost-reducing effect. In addition, the positive influence of relationship length sharply increases: If we measure length in a linear way by the variable Duration, the coefficient doubles [see models (2) and (5)]. If we take instead the dummy variable LongDuration, the coefficient increases by 50% [see models (3) and (6)]. This implies that bank-dependent borrowers do not obtain a discount for concentrating their borrowing on one bank. After several relationship years, they even face a clear net disadvantage. The interest rate premium equals roughly 30 basis points. While bank-dependent borrowers do not benefit from close relationships via favorable price-contract terms, they might benefit via nonprice conditions (which we do not know). This issue is, however, beyond the scope of our paper.
By contrast, for non bank-dependent borrowers [see models (7) and (8)], the cost-reducing impact of relationship strength is much more pronounced than in the reference models [models (2) and (3)]. Likewise, the cost-increasing effect of relationship length is considerably smaller than in the reference model [see model (8)] or even vanishes [according to model (7)]. Adding up the effects of relationship strength and length, non bank-dependent companies receive a substantial net advantage of tying to a relationship lender, even after several relationship years [of roughly 65 basis points according to model (8)]. This implies a difference of approximately 100 basis points between bank-dependent and non bank-dependent companies.
Development of borrowing costs around switching the main lender (Equation 3)
In Table 5 , we examine how the interest spread develops when the borrower switches to a new main lender. In line with the previous results, we find an interest rate discount in the year of the switch of the main lender. The interest rate discount equals nine basis points, but is (based on average borrowers) not statistically significant. We now investigate whether the amount of discount depends on the characteristics of the previous main lender. There are two possible explanations why the previous main lender may influence the discount: First, an interest rate advantage after a switch is consistent with a hold-up by the previous main lender. Second, the previous main lender may have been relatively small. The previous lender may have faced concentration risks in its loan portfolio with respect to the company and may have, therefore, demanded an interest
The Price Impact of Lending Relationships À0.011 À0.011 À0.011 À0.014 À0.011 (6.68)*** (6.71)*** (6.67)*** (6.61)*** (6.69)*** Short-term loans (firm) À0.010 À0.010 À0.010 À0.011 À0.010 (8.40)*** (8.19)*** (8.26)*** (6.95)*** (8.19)*** Loans from assoc. companies (firm) À0.017 À0.017 À0.017 À0.012 À0.017 (9.32)*** (9.45)*** (9.39)*** (5.13)*** (9.41)*** Loans from owners (firm) À0.019 À0.019 À0.018 À0.016 À0.019 (11.57)*** (11.45)*** (11.39)*** (6.91)*** (11.41)*** Debt securities (firm) À0.009 À0.009 À0.009 À0.006 À0.009 (3.59)*** (3.73)*** (3.68)*** ( . Switch is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm has changed its main lender in the current period (0 otherwise). Switch is interacted with different dummy variables of the main lender in t À 1, which reflect (due to the switch) the characteristics of the previous main lender. StrongRel tÀ1 (Non-StrongRel tÀ1 ) is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the previous lender held at least 80% (less than 80%) of a firm's total bank debt, and 0 otherwise. rate premium. Switching to a larger main lender should then reduce borrowing costs (motivated by the evidence in Gopalan et al., 2011) . If concentration risks are relevant and borrowers switch lenders to avoid a premium incurring for this reason, we expect the interest rate advantage to be larger for borrowers that switch to a larger new main lender. Model (2) is in line with this prediction. Borrowers that change to a larger new main lender receive a significant interest rate advantage in the year of the switch. The discount equals 14 basis points. Switching to a main lender that is smaller than or of equal size to the previous one does not affect borrowing costs at all.
We test the hold-up hypothesis in models (3) and (4). The hold-up hypothesis implies that the interest rate advantage after a switch is larger for borrowers that had a long relationship with their previous main bank. Moreover, the interest rate discount should also be larger for borrowers that maintained a strong relationship with their previous main bank since the main lender's share influences its information advantage and its hold-up potential. We find evidence that is consistent with both predictions. Borrowers that maintained a strong relationship with their previous main lender acquire a substantial interest rate discount after the switch [33 basis points, see model (3)]. By contrast, for borrowers that did not have a strong relationship with their previous main lender, financing costs remain constant after a switch. Finally, companies that have a long relationship with their previous main lender also acquire a considerable discount after a switch [18 basis points, see model (4)]. For companies with a short relationship, borrowing costs do not alter. The discount for the first group is, however, not statistically significant. This may be due to the smaller sample size for model (4) than for models (2) and (3). 7 In model (5), we include both significant interaction terms of models (2) and (3) (in addition to the dummy variable Switch) to further investigate how relevant concentration risks and the hold-up argument are. Hence, the marginal effect for borrowers that switch and had a strong relationship with their previous main lender is now calculated as the sum of the coefficients of Switch and Switch*StrongRel tÀ1 . As model (5) shows, the marginal effect for this group of borrowers goes down [compared to model (3)], but borrowers still receive a large dis-ML larger (ML smaller or equal size) is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the current main lender is larger than (smaller than or of equal size to) the previous one, and 0 otherwise. LongDuration tÀ1 (Non-LongDuration tÀ1 ) is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the previous main lender had been the firm's main lender for at least five years (for less than five years), and 0 otherwise. Size (main lender) and Size (firm) are measured by the log of total assets. Firm years denotes the number of years for which the company has been included in the sample (up to the current year). For the definition of the remaining variables, see Table 2 . The last row of the table indicates whether the regression is based on a subsample. For model (4), which includes an interaction term of Switch and LongDuration, the sample is confined to companies which have been included in the sample for at least six years, i.e. we include companies only from the sixth observation onwards. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant results at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The regressions include year dummies and a constant. (4), we only include companies for which we have at least six years of observations [like in the models (2)-(8) in Table 4 ].
count and significantly differ from average borrowers. By contrast, borrowers that switch to a larger main lender acquire a considerably smaller discount and do not significantly differ any more from the average borrower. Our results concerning switching, therefore, support the hold-up hypothesis.
A related study to our paper is Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) . They find that borrowers receive a discount after switching the lender. Over time, the new lender increases loan rates, so that the borrower has to pay a premium after some relationship years. This dynamic pattern is qualitatively in line with our findings. The quantitative effects, however, are much smaller in our study; in particular, the increase of loan rates over time is much slower. Moreover, average borrowers that have a strong relationship with their main lender receive a considerable interest rate advantage even after several relationship years. One reason for the different findings is that firms in our sample are larger than in Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) and are, therefore, less exposed to the risk of a hold-up. Moreover, while the two authors study the loan rate dynamics in an emerging market, we focus on an industrialized country with a much more competitive banking market. This implies that enforcing higher loan rates is much more difficult for the banks in our sample (see Petersen and Rajan, 1995) .
Robustness checks
We carry out a number of robustness checks with respect to the measurement of relationship strength and duration. Equations (1) and (2) (static and dynamic impact of lending relationships, Table 4 ) and Equation (3) (development of borrowing costs around a switch of the main lender, Table 5 ) mainly differ only with respect to the different interactions terms in Equation (3). For the robustness checks of the models in Table 5 , we thus focus on the sensitivity of the interaction terms. Regression output is available in the online Appendix S2. 8
Measuring relationship strength
Our proxy for relationship strength may be affected by truncation in the credit register. The variable StrongRel is based only on information from the credit register (due to the different definitions of debt in the credit register and the balance sheet statistics). However, since loans of less than EUR 1.5 million are reported only in part of the cases in the credit register (see Section 3), the variable may be biased and may overstate the importance of the largest lender. We, therefore, carry out several robustness checks with respect to our measure of relationship strength StrongRel included in Equations (1) and (2). In Table S1 , we repeat the two regression models (1) and (4) of Table 4 , which are described by Equations (1) and (2). In Table S3 , we carry out the corresponding robustness checks with respect to the interaction term constructed with StrongRel in Equation (3) [namely regression model (3) of Table 5 ].
8. Since firm assets exhibit a very large standard deviation, we also carried out robustness checks with respect to this variable. To investigate the impact of outliers we excluded all observations with values above the 99th percentile (below the 1st percentile) from the sample and repeated all regression models presented in Tables 4 and 5 . Results do not change much (not reported).
First, as especially small companies are exposed to the problem of truncation, we exclude small companies (sales below median) from our sample [see models (1) and (2) in Table S1 and model (1) in Table S3 ]. The coefficient of relationship strength tends to increase somewhat compared to model (1) in Table 4 (in absolute terms). The coefficient of the interaction term between Switch and StrongRel increases as well (in absolute terms).
Our second robustness check refers to a comparison of the debt level in the credit register and on the balance sheet. The idea is that the credit register shows a more reliable picture for those companies for which the sum of loans across all banks (according to the credit register) is relatively high compared to the debt level on the balance sheet. Therefore, we restrict our observations to those companies for which the sum of loans in the credit register is at least 90% of the corresponding amount in the balance sheet statistics [see models (3) and (4) in Table S1 and model (2) in Table S3 ]. Once again, the impact of relationship strength increases, as indicated by the coefficients of StrongRel and of the interaction term between StrongRel and Switch. Moreover, the profile over time [advantage at the beginning and increase over time, see model (4) in Table S1 ] becomes also more pronounced. Our first and second robustness checks have, therefore, in common that results become clearer.
Third, we carry out an additional robustness check with respect to truncation by constructing an indicator of relationship strength which combines information from the credit register (CR) with the balance sheet statistics (BS). Data from these two data sources may differ because i) loans of less than EUR 1.5 million are reported only in part of the cases in the credit register and ii) data sources apply different definitions of debt. As we are interested only in the effects of truncation (i.e. i), we construct a new indicator in two steps. In the first step, we create an auxiliary variable which classifies a relationship as strong if StrongRel temp;it ¼ 1 if largest loan it according to CR P bank loans it according to BS [ 80% 0 otherwise.
( 9 When we compare StrongRel temp with the indicator according to the original definition (StrongRel), three cases are possible. In the best case (i), the two variables are identical. If StrongRel temp = 0 and StrongRel = 1 (ii), this is probably due to truncation in the credit register as, for example, smaller exposures of other banks are not shown in the credit register. However, if StrongRel temp = 1 and StrongRel = 0 (iii), this combination results from the fact that the balance sheet statistics in general apply a narrower definition of bank debt than the credit register. In this case, the new indicator would overstate the importance of the largest lender. We thus combine the two indicators in a single variable which contains the value of StrongRel temp in case (ii) and the value of StrongRel in case (iii):
In models (5) and (6) in Table S1 , StrongRel is replaced by the new indicator StrongRel BSCR . The effects of relationship strength decrease, but relationship 9. We apply a narrow definition of debt and include only bank loans in the denominator (see discussion in Section 3.
The Price Impact of Lending Relationships strength remains significant at the 1% level. The profile over time is slightly less pronounced [see model (6)]. We also replace the interaction term between Switch and StrongRel and that between Switch and Non-StrongRel by new interaction terms based on StrongRel BSCR [see model (3) in Table S3 ]. The coefficient of the interaction term between Switch and StrongRel roughly doubles, implying a larger difference between companies with and without a strong relationship with their main lender. Overall, the analyses concerning truncation in the credit register thus support the robustness of our results. Another potential critical issue with respect to our measure of relationship strength is the threshold above which a relationship is classified as strong. We vary this threshold and increase (decrease) the threshold to 90% (70%), i.e. relationships are considered as strong if the main bank holds at least 90% (70%) of a company's total bank debt. The results for regressions carried out in Tables 4 and 5 do not change much (not reported).
Measuring relationship length
When we examine the influence of duration, we face the problem that we can measure duration only by observing relationships over the sample period. We, therefore, cannot accurately quantify the variable in all cases. In the first years of the sample, this issue is particularly relevant since the variation in duration is also much lower than in the last years of the sample. In our above regressions, we tried to tackle this problem in two ways: Firstly, we restricted the sample to companies for which we have at least six years of observations, i.e. we included the companies only from the sixth observation onwards. Secondly, we controlled for the number of years a company has been included in the sample up to the current year. Overall, it is important to keep in mind that our measure of duration is shorter than in other studies, since we measure duration by the number of subsequent years for which a bank has been a firm's main lender (and not by the number of subsequent years a bank has maintained a relationship with the firm). This implies that we observe more switches and the issue of left and right censoring is less acute.
To test the sensitivity of our results with respect to the measurement of relationship length, we carry out an additional robustness check. We are able to correctly measure the value of Duration for relationships which were established after the start of our sample. We, therefore, exclude all left censored observations, i.e. we focus on firms that switched their main lender at least once over the sample period and confine the sample to the observations after the first observed switch. Moreover, the regressions include only those observations where no data gap occurred (see Section 3). Results for models (2)-(4) of Table 4 are presented in Table S2 as models (1)-(3). Compared to our results above, duration is not significant any more when it is measured by a linear term [see model (1) of Table S2 ]. Apart from this point, results are similar to our previous regression output. In particular, the dynamic profile of relationship lending (i.e. discount at the beginning and increase over time) does not change [see model (3)]. This pattern, therefore, seems to be robust.
We apply this robustness check also to model (4) of Table 5 , which contains interaction terms derived from Switch and LongDuration [presented as model (4) in Table S3 ]. Results are qualitatively similar to those above, i.e. differences between companies with and without a long relationship with their main lender can be observed, but are not statistically significant.
CONCLUSION
This study examines how lending relationships affect a firm's borrowing costs. We consider the impact of relationship strengthproxied by the share of bank debt provided by the lenderand relationship length. We thereby focus on the relationship with the main lender. We also investigate how borrowing costs develop around switching the main lender. We use a unique, comprehensive dataset for Germany. The dataset consists of panel data of bank-firm relationships over 12 years and contains firms of all size classes.
We find that relationship strength and duration have a different impact on borrowing costs. While borrowing costs decrease with relationship strength, they rise with the duration of the lending relationship. However, the increase over time is rather weak on average. Since firms with close ties to their main lender receive a large discount at the beginning of the relationship, they still enjoy a financing advantage after several relationship years (of around 20 basis points for firms with a relationship of at least five years). This finding is, however, only valid for average borrowers. The impact of relationship strength and length also depend on a firm's funding structure. Bank-dependent borrowers, i.e. firms that borrow a high fraction from banks, do not obtain a discount for concentrating borrowing on one bank. In addition, borrowing costs increase more strongly over relationship length for such borrowers. This implies a considerable interest rate premium after several relationship years (of around 30 basis points).
These results show that relationship lending (measured by relationship strength and length) leads to benefits for average borrowers, but may also imply larger costs in the medium to long term. Costs result from the information advantage acquired by the relationship bank, which enables the bank to hold-up the borrower. In particular, bank-dependent borrowers (typically small firms in Germany) face a significant risk of a hold-up by the relationship bank. Bank-dependent borrowers, therefore, carry higher costs via the price impact of lending relationships. They might, however, benefit to a larger degree than non-bank dependent borrowers from favorable non-price conditions (such as better access to credit). This latter issue, however, is beyond the scope of our paper.
Our results for how borrowing costs develop around switching the main lender are consistent with hold-up costs. We find that switching the main lender initially leads, on average, to a small insignificant price discount. However, this price discount is large and significant for borrowers that had a strong relationship with their previous main lender. Borrowers without a strong relationship to their previous main lender do not receive a discount at all. This finding suggests that the previous lender was able to require an interest rate premium only in the case of borrowers with close ties.
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